Discrimination

In fundamental nature, yes; in individual qualities, no. As human persons endowed with inalienable dignity, we are completely equal. In terms of talents, capacities, health, and circumstances, we are wonderfully varied and different.

Where things are genuinely different, it is proper and just to treat them differently. The challenge arises when things are partly equal and partly different. In such cases, justice requires balance: treating what is equal with equality, and what is different with appropriate distinction. For example, a person without formal training in chemistry should not be appointed a university professor in that field, yet this distinction in no way diminishes his inalienable dignity as a human person.

Unjust discrimination occurs when an arbitrary distinction is made where there is fundamental equality, and where that differential treatment violates justice. Conversely, it is not discrimination to recognize genuine, objective differences. Nor does discrimination exist whenever justice is faithfully upheld.

- Here, legitimate secondary differences exist, but it is unjust to use them to deny essential human rights:

• Woman and man are distinct in biological sex and complementary gifts, yet both are human persons possessing equal fundamental rights and dignity. Denying those fundamental rights constitutes unjust discrimination.
• A human embryo is biologically at an earlier developmental stage than a newborn or an adult, yet each is a living human person. While duties and capacities vary according to age, there must be zero discrimination regarding their fundamental right to life.
• A sick or disabled person differs in physical capacity from a healthy worker, which naturally affects employment duties; but they possess identical personal dignity, and denying them humane care and respect constitutes unjust discrimination.

- Here, objective differences exist, and justice calls for distinguishing:

• Truth does not “discriminate” against error: truth corresponds to reality, whereas error does not. They are objectively contrary, and it is right to distinguish between them.
• Moral goodness does not “discriminate” against evil: one act is virtuous, while another is harmful. They are objectively distinct, and justice demands recognizing the difference.
• Making a personal choice is not discrimination: choosing one option among legitimate alternatives does not discriminate, provided no injustice is committed or perpetuated.

Where legitimate freedom of choice exists, a person may choose according to personal preference. For example, when someone buys a particular car, choosing one brand over others does not constitute discrimination against the other manufacturers, even if some models possess superior features.

It typically arises from exaggerating an accidental or incidental trait into an absolute distinction:

• Racial discrimination: exaggerating the moral significance of skin color or ethnicity.
• Nationalistic discrimination: exalting place of birth above shared human solidarity.
• Qualitative / utilitarian discrimination: treating developmental or health differences as an excuse to extinguish life—such as killing an unborn child via abortion, or eliminating the frail and sick via euthanasia.

A friend asked to highlight this pressing issue. Individuals with Down syndrome have cognitive and physical limitations, yet they are human persons endowed with full dignity, and often radiant with affection and goodness. They must be treated with unconditional reverence. For instance, selectively aborting a child because of Down syndrome is a grave crime against humanity. The discrimination here stems from two sources: the inconvenience of specialized care, and a superficial cultural obsession where having only conventionally perfect children is in fashion. Such discrimination is either qualitative (judging human worth by utility) or eugenic (eliminating persons to “purify” the gene pool).

More examples of unjust discrimination are analyzed in the article on male chauvinism.